Doctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law by Ip, Eric C.
Title Doctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Author(s) Ip, Eric C.
Citation Supreme Court Economic Review, 2014, v. 22, p. 147-180
Issued Date 2014
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/233892
Rights This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Doctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American  
Administrative Law
Eric C. Ip*
English administrative law guards judicial supremacy over 
all matters of statutory interpretation, while instructing 
judges to refrain from scrutinizing administrators’ factual 
findings. By contrast, American federal courts are obliged to 
respect agencies’ statutory-interpretive autonomy, but take a 
rigorous “hard look” at substantial agency factual determi-
nations. This Article argues that the antithetical approaches 
to judicial review of administrative action adopted by the 
apex courts of the United Kingdom and the United States 
can be adequately explained by the polarization of these two 
polities along a spectrum of effective vetogates. 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
Positive political theory (PPT) has made important contributions to 
the empirical and, increasingly, the normative study of administra-
tive law in the United States. Recently, Elizabeth Magill and Daniel 
Ortiz predicted that PPT theories must fail when applied to the 
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong Faculty of Law. He can be reached at ericip@cuhk.edu.hk.
 Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Im-
prove Public Law (Yale 997); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administra-
tive Law, 72 Chi Kent L R 953 (997); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Administrative Law, in 
K.E. Whittington, et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 340 (Oxford 
2008); Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory 
of Public Choice and Public Law, in D.A. Farber and A.J. O’Connell, eds, Research 
Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law  (Elgar 200).
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United Kingdom,2 where judicial review “has real bite”3 and “is 
much more than a rubber stamp.”4 In their reading of PPT, judicial 
review in an administrative law context becomes politically conse-
quential only in presidential systems like the United States, where 
presidential-congressional gridlock opens up room for agency mal-
feasance, hence also opportunities for judicial intervention; whereas 
in parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom, the close align-
ment of Government and Parliament squeezes out opportunities for 
agencies to act unfaithfully to their political principals, and with it 
any room for judicial review.5 This intuition is powerful in a con-
stitutional law context: the US Supreme Court does regularly in-
validate acts of Congress,6 whereas the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords (the Law Lords) has consistently upheld the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty.7 
2 There is no overarching “UK legal system.” The process of union has resulted in 
the United Kingdom being constituted by three separate jurisdictions: England and 
Wales (conventionally abbreviated as “England” in the context of law), Northern Ire-
land, and Scotland. Each jurisdiction has a separate judiciary. Particularly, Scotland is 
a mixed civil law–common law jurisdiction. See, for instance, Andrew Le Sueur and 
Evelyn Ellis, Constitutional Fundamentals, in David Feldman, ed, Oxford Principles 
of English Law: English Public Law 2 (Oxford 2009). 
3 M. Elizabeth Magill and Daniel Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory, 
in S. Rose-Ackerman and P. Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law 34–35 
(Elgar 200).
4 Id at 42.
5 Id at 37. 
6 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law: 
An Introduction, in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative 
Law at 439 (cited in note 3).
7 The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (and its successor, the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom) exercised appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
cases from England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and civil cases from Scotland. 
This Article is only interested in the Appellate Committee or the UK Supreme Court 
acting in its capacity as the final court of appeal of England and Wales, rather than 
Northern Ireland and Scotland. Before the Human Rights Act was enacted in 998, 
there were only a few cases in which it could be said that the Law Lords had exer-
cised some form of judicial review of primary legislation. In R v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited, [99] AC 603 and R v Secretary of State 
for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission, [995]  AC , the Law 
Lords had asserted the power to “disapply” acts of Parliament that breach European 
Union directives. However, this case, as with similar ones, merely reiterated the 
supremacy of European Union law over relevant aspects of UK domestic law, rather 
than applied domestic constitutional principles to gauge the merits of primary legis-
lation. Furthermore, this decision has not triggered in England and Wales any wave 
of judicial review of legislation on European Union law grounds. See Brice Dickson, 
Judicial Activism in the House of Lords 1995–2007, in Brice Dickson, ed, Judicial 
Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts 363 (Oxford 2007).
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Contrary to the Magill-Ortiz account, however, the accepted view 
among PPT scholars is that the primary judicial function in admin-
istrative law is to undertake routine oversight tasks such as moni-
toring lower-level government agents, rather than to rule on fun-
damental political values, as typifies constitutional controversies.8 
The PPT of administrative law is concerned with how agency costs 
are controlled, manipulated, and reduced. There is no reason to as-
sume that bureaucrats in parliamentary systems shirk less than their 
counterparts in presidential ones. Notwithstanding their common 
historical origins, English and American administrative law tradi-
tions part company in ways too important to be overlooked. Most 
notably, the United Kingdom and the United States have adopted 
exactly opposite doctrines of judicial review respecting questions of 
law versus questions of fact.9 In general, English administrative law 
jealously guards the supremacy of courts in all matters of statutory 
interpretation, while obligating them to refrain from scrutinizing 
administrators’ factual findings, whereas its American counterpart 
instructs the federal courts to respect agencies’ statutory-interpretive 
autonomy, on the one hand, and take a rigorously “hard look” at sub-
stantial agency factual and policy determinations on the other.0 Par-
ticularly, the US approach—requiring courts to defer on legal matters 
that are supposed to be within their own expertise, while interven-
ing in more administrative matters—seems counterintuitive. Justice 
Stephen Breyer, while still a circuit judge, called it “an important 
anomaly.” For Richard Epstein, it was “[t]he great tragedy of modern 
administrative law.”2 
8 See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Repu-
tation versus Legal Tradition 3(2) J Legal Analysis 43 (20); William Bishop, A 
Theory of Administrative Law, 9 J Legal Stud 489 (990).
9 Notice that, as analytical categories, questions of law and questions of fact are 
not mutually exclusive: “errors of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters 
of fact reach upward without a break, into mattes of law.” John Dickinson, Admin-
istrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 55 (Harvard 927). See also Robert C. 
Dolehide, A Comparative “Hard Look” at Chevron: What the United Kingdom and 
Australia Reveal about American Administrative Law, 99 Tex L R 28 (200).
0 Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law 2 (Oxford 3d ed 996); 
Paul Craig, Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative Perspective, in 
Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law at 449 (cited 
in note 3); Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Adminis-
tration, and the Rule of Law 54 (Harvard 20); Eric C. Ip, Taking a ‘Hard Look’ at 
‘Irrationality’: Substantive Review of Administrative Discretion in the US and UK 
Supreme Courts, 34 Oxford J Legal Stud 48 (204).
 Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin 
L Rev 397 (986). 
2 Epstein, Design for Liberty at 54 (cited in note 0).
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This Article undertakes the heretofore untried task of explain-
ing this doctrinal antithesis in the administrative common law3 of 
the UK judicial House of Lords4 and the US Supreme Court.5 Sec-
tion II constructs out of the relevant PPT literature an explanatory 
framework, the centerpiece of which is the concept of “vetogates.” 
These are institutions competent to veto legislative or policy pro-
posals in circumstances that may force a reversion to the status 
quo.6 Bear in mind that this framework is primarily positive, and 
focuses exclusively on questions of common law doctrinal design. 
Consequently, it is unconcerned with the normative justifiability 
of individual administrative law principles, and makes no empirical 
pretense that the courts of England and America have in practice 
adhered unswervingly to their stark differences in doctrine.7
Section III evidences that English and American administrative 
law once had much in common, both historically and doctrinally. 
Section IV shows how the polarization of these two polities along a 
spectrum measuring the number of effective vetogates within the 
law-making process is key to explaining why doctrinal antithesis 
overtook English and American administrative law, their historical 
similarities notwithstanding.8 The scarcity of effective vetogates in 
3 Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 Geo Wash L R 
295 (202). This Article is not concerned with constitutional judicial review on the 
basis of codified constitutional instruments such as the Constitution of the United 
States and the Human Rights Act 998. 
4 Positive political theory or rational choice theory is underdeveloped in the study 
of British government and laws. See Keith Dowding, Rational Choice and British 
Politics, in A. Gamble, et al, eds, Oxford Handbook of British Politics 75 (Oxford 
2009).
5 In addition, this Article is not concerned with how the administrative law deci-
sions of the Law Lords and the US Supreme Court were implemented. A number of 
PPT-informed empirical studies have been dedicated to this question in the Ameri-
can context. See, for instance, Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges 
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 
823 (2006); Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U Chi L Rev 76 (2008). 
6 Stephan Haggard, The Politics of Corporate and Financial Restructuring: A 
Comparison of Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, in Stijn Claessens, et al, eds, Resolu-
tion of Financial Distress: An International Perspective on the Design of Bankruptcy 
Laws 262, n (World Bank 200).
7 For instance, in the United Kingdom, as a practical matter, the English courts do 
not always substitute judgment on questions of law or spell out the precise meaning 
of all statutory conditions in enabling acts; sometimes they assigned the labels “law” 
and “fact” to different questions depending on whether they want to intervene or not. 
Craig, Judicial Review of Questions of Law at 453 (cited in note 0). 
8 Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle, in 
C. Menard and M.M. Shriley, eds, Handbook of New Institutional Economics 32 
(Springer 2005).
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the United Kingdom enabled Parliament to delegate scant statutory 
interpretative authority to the administrative state and to conserve 
more oversight powers in the House of Commons majority whose 
leaders constitute the Government. This has not only persuaded but 
also compelled the Law Lords to devise doctrines that disregard stat-
utory interpretations of administrators while giving a wide margin 
of deference to the majority’s primacy in overseeing administrative 
findings of fact. By contrast, the multiplicity of vetogates in Amer-
ica drove Congress to delegate considerable statutory interpretative 
powers to the agencies, and also weakened the oversight capacity 
of congressional majorities. Both of these outcomes spurred the Su-
preme Court to encode respect for agency statutory interpretations 
but not agency evidentiary findings into its administrative jurispru-
dence. Section V offers some concluding remarks.
I I .  V E T O G A T E S  A N D  A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  L A W
A. Overview
Positive political theory consists of the analysis of political institu-
tions, decision making, and behavior from a microeconomic stand-
point, using its methodological and theoretical assumptions, namely, 
that policy outcomes result from the choices of self-interested, ratio-
nal, utility-maximizing political players who, like market players, 
interact interdependently under incomplete information.9 The prin-
cipal contributions of PPT to the field of law and economics include, 
but are not limited to, measuring and predicting the supply and de-
mand of legislation throughout the law-making process, and under-
standing the strategic interaction between courts and political ac-
tors.20 PPT scholars have concentrated increasingly on investigating 
the forces shaping the content of judicial doctrines.2 On this view, 
final appellate adjudication not only decides the outcome of the case 
at bar but also articulates doctrines destined to regulate similar cases 
across the entire legal system. This gives an apex court incentive to 
act strategically when fashioning judicial doctrines so as to facilitate 
9 See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge 2003); Matthew D. Mc-
Cubbins, et al, The Political Economy of Law, in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds, 
Handbook of Law and Economics 2 662 (Elsevier 2007).
20 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in 
the Nineties, 80 Geo L J 457 (992).
2 See Tonja Jacobi and Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 
23(2) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 326 (2007); Rachel K. Hinkle, et al, 
A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in District Court 
Opinions, 4(2) J Legal Analysis 407 (202). 
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decisional efficiency or further its preferred policy outcomes. In this 
process the court typically has to trade off vagueness for specific-
ity and narrowness for breadth, subject to the reactions of other ac-
tors and the constraints of the constitutional system, professional-
ism, and desires for popular legitimacy.22
PPT analysts ordinarily operate at two levels, strategic design 
(rules of the game) and strategic action (play of the game).23 Strategic 
design analysis tries to explain how institutions are constructed to 
conduce to policy outcomes consistent with the preferences of the 
designer; whereas strategic action analysis, taking the institutional 
rules as given, predicts players’ behavior. Consider this analytical 
structure as applied to administrative law and the governance of leg-
islative delegation to agencies.24 Design analysis inquires how leg-
islatures act rationally and strategically when enacting regulatory 
and enabling statutes.25 These statutes set in motion, at the next, 
action stage, a complex process of strategic administrative produc-
tion of regulatory public policy through collection and analysis of 
information relevant to the determination of the applicability of 
legislative instructions to concrete circumstances.26 The two levels 
of PPT analysis, strategic design and strategic action, parallel the 
two orders of questions in administrative law—questions of law and 
questions of fact.
B. Strategic Design and Questions of Law
In practice, legislatures rarely monopolize the strategic design of 
regulatory governance. Because of their own resource scarcities, they 
can, do, and must “outsource” or delegate the function of filling 
in incomplete statutory terms and resolving their ambiguities—a 
kind of limited de facto law making—to administrative agencies and 
22 Scott Baker and Pauline T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice, 4(2) 
J Legal Analysis 329 (202).
23 Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-based Strategies in Law and Positive Political 
Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 50(5) U Penn L R 455-6 (2002); see 
Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, in F. Parisi and 
C.K. Rowley, eds, The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fa-
thers 495 ( Elgar 2007).
24 Daniel L. Soulber and David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regu-
latory Mandate, 8 J L Econ & Org 26 (992). 
25 Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent 
Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 Pub Choice 5 (984); McCubbins, 
et al, The Political Economy of Law at 725 (cited in note 9). 
26 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 
72 Wash U L Q 44 (994).
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courts.27 The theory of “vetogates” in the PPT literature is particu-
larly helpful in explaining this phenomenon. This theory holds that 
laws and important policies cannot be legitimately changed unless 
alternatives exist that all vetogates prefer to the status quo.28 Some 
vetogates exist within the legislature, for example, the separation 
of lower from upper houses, and these tend to increase the internal 
transaction costs to legislators of agreeing on legislation. Others lie 
outside the legislature, for example, a veto-wielding head of state, 
heightening the external transaction costs of legislating. As the total 
number of effective29 vetogates increases, it becomes harder for the 
interests represented by the various vetogates to converge on de-
tailed agreements that satisfy everyone’s preferences; consequently, 
statutes become both more ambiguous and more difficult to enact or 
repeal.30 Overall, the polity becomes more stable but less decisive.3
Indeterminate terms in regulatory statutes, left unresolved, leave 
policies uncertain, incurring social costs. A highly likely outcome 
is massive coordination problems among agencies, individuals, and 
groups, rooted in conflicts over the law’s “meaning,” which can even 
lead to violent extralegal conflict that benefits no one. Legislatures 
encumbered by multiple effective vetogates will have little choice 
but to delegate a considerable amount of elaboration and interpreta-
tion of statutes to those responsible for administering them, namely, 
agencies, as these are placed beyond the constraints of legislative 
process vetogates. Even if agencies do not perfectly align with the 
policy preferences of legislatures, their joint interest in successful 
policy outcomes may override their differences.32 
27 Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 4 (Stanford 
2009). 
28 William B. Heller and Mathew D. McCubbins, Political Institutions and Eco-
nomic Development: The Case of Electric Utility Regulation in Argentina and Chile, 
in Stephen Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds, Presidents, Parliaments, and 
Policy 230 (Cambridge 200).
29 The effectiveness of vetogates is emphasized because it is possible for one 
vetogate to be “absorbed” by another. For instance, if the same legislative major-
ity controls both the lower and upper houses (each being a vetogate) of a bicameral 
legislature, then the two vetogates will effectively become one—being absorbed by 
that majority. See George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work 26 
(Princeton 2002).
30 William N. Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law, J L Econ & Org *2 
(forthcoming 202).
3 Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of 
Economic Policy Outcomes, in Haggard and McCubbins, eds, Presidents, Parlia-
ments, and Policy at 27 (cited in note 28).
32 Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 9 (cited in 
note 27). 
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Delegation to agencies entails that some of their authority to 
elaborate and interpret statutes inevitably spills over to the courts, 
which also enjoy powers of statutory interpretation.33 From the legis-
lature’s standpoint, however, agencies often make better candidates 
for this role: typically, they are more familiar with the legislative 
process and its heterogeneous outputs;34 tend to possess more spe-
cialized technical expertise;35 and have better access to information 
illumining the nexus between policy choices and actual regulatory 
outcomes and priorities.36 By contrast, courts are normally politically 
insulated and lack ideological coherence, outcome-orientation,37 or 
familiarity with the peculiar backgrounds of particular statutes.38 
Judges are generalists limited by cumbersome legal procedures such 
as the doctrine of stare decisis or jurisprudence constante, and suf-
fer from informational disadvantages and shortages of staff and of 
investigatory resources.39 The proliferation of unresolved policy and 
regulatory questions relevant to the day-to-day implementation of 
primary legislation lessens the importance of the courts in articulat-
ing authoritative interpretations of administrative law, as compared 
to agencies. 
C. Strategic Action
Enabling statutes almost always condition their enablement of ad-
ministrative action upon certain factual circumstances that legiti-
mize the exercise of (thus implicitly constituting a constraint on) 
administrative discretion: an agency can act only if specified facts 
exist or if its acts will trigger specific changes to such facts.40 Now 
analogize a legislature to a board of directors wielding broad over-
sight over “managers” (that is, the political executive), but unable 
33 Id at 4.
34 Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal 
Interpretation 20 (Cambridge 2006).
35 Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U Chi L R 42 (200).
36 Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Farber and 
O’Connell, eds, Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law at 287–89 
(cited in note 2).
37 See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plau-
sibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tions, 20 Harv L R 528 (2006).
38 See Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty at 23 (cited in note 34).
39 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 853 (Aspen 8th ed 20). 
40 See Paul R. Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 
27 Wm & Mary L Rev 685 (986).
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to scrutinize—because of limited human capacity4 to “microman-
age”42 policy outcomes—the daily fact-finding activities of subor-
dinate employees (administrative agencies). Given the problems of 
time inconsistency and “coalitional drift,”43 the governing majority 
may not favor every statute enacted by its opponents, yet sufficient 
reasons exist to persuade it to prefer in the aggregate agencies’ gen-
eral respect for any such statute. William Landes and Richard Posner 
observe that such respect, which contributes to statutory longevity, 
enables incumbent majorities to make credible policy commitments 
that give them bargaining power with organized interests who seek 
specific legislation in exchange for political support.44 
Agencies, however, have an incentive to depart from their legal 
mandates. They have better information than the legislature about 
the effects of their acts on outcomes.45 Sometimes agencies are 
merely bypassing rigid statutory dictates in order to adapt to chang-
ing realities—after all, creative bureaucrats are as essential to the 
smooth working of the polity as creative middle and upper manag-
ers are to firms.46 In other cases, agency departure from statutory 
schemes stems from outright shirking or ideological differences with 
the legislature, and may lead to politically undesirable, even devas-
tating, effects on public policy.47 Agencies that disregard statutory 
mandates are often acting on inaccurate understandings of fact as 
well;48 for instance, their fact-finding methods may be heavily biased, 
or they may disregard of relevant evidence in the course of formulat-
ing policy-implementing administrative programs. 
Thomas Schwartz and Matthew McCubbins have typologized the 
various means available to legislatures to exact agency obedience 
4 Yadira Gonzalez de Lara, et al, The Administrative Foundations of Self- 
enforcing Constitutions, 98 Am Econ Rev 05 (2008).
42 David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost 
Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers 27 (Cambridge 999).
43 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consis-
tency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J L Econ & Org  (992).
44 William Landes and Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 8 J L & Econ 875 (975). 
45 Tom Ginsburg, Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the 
Constitutional Character of Administrative Law, in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth, 
eds, Comparative Administrative Law at 7 (cited in note 3).
46 Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System at 56 (cited in note 25).
47 See Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institu-
tional Choice in the Public Sector (Cambridge 995).
48 Richard J. Pierce, et al, Administrative Law and Process 2 (Foundation 4th ed 
2004). 
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to valid laws,49 subject to the number of effective vetogates. Legis-
latures may resort to their prerogatives of dismissal of staffs or of 
nullification of administrative decisions. Less drastically, they may 
lessen their informational disadvantage through “police patrols,” as 
by committees seeking evidence of bureaucratic malfeasance, or by 
public hearings, press releases, letters of threat, and so forth, making 
life unpleasant for administrative officials;50 or through “fire alarm” 
procedures whereby recipients of administrative services bring bu-
reaucratic defiance to the attention of legislators, reducing the trans-
action costs of oversight.5 In addition a legislature may use admin-
istrative procedures to rebalance asymmetries of information,52 or 
“stack the deck” during agency proceedings in favor of the interests 
which were paramount in the enactment of enabling statutes.53 But 
administrative procedures will not matter unless they are enforced. 
“Fire-extinguishers” avail here, Legislatures outsourcing oversight 
to administrative services recipients by granting them standing to 
sue malfeasant agencies in court.54 
The correction of administrative failure tends to be easier in pol-
ities where fewer vetogates prevent legislatures from acting deci-
sively to undo agency decisions. If legislatures can by themselves 
hold agencies to effective account, this will naturally lessen demand 
for fire-extinguisher litigation to impose liability on agencies.55 
Courts may continue to protect individual rights, but will not re-
view the merits of administrative action.56 By contrast, a multiplic-
ity of vetogates raises the costs to legislatures of recalling delega-
tion and exerting oversight.57 This will likely raise demand for fire 
extinguishers unfettered by vetogates, to perform some of the legis-
49 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Over-
looked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Pol Sc 65 (984). See also Arthur 
Lucia and Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police 
Patrols Reconstructed, 0 J L Econ & Org 96 (994). 
50 Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies at 295 (cited in note 36).
5 See Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress (Cambridge 2008). 
52 Matthew D. McCubbins, et al, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control 3J, L Econ & Org 273 (987). 
53 Matthew D. McCubbins, et al, The Political Origins of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 J L Econ & Org 86 (999).
54 John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy, in 
B.R. Weingast and D.A. Wittman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 
269 (Oxford 2006). 
55 See Peter Cane, Administrative Law 4 (Oxford 4th ed 2004). 
56 Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance at 98 (cited in note ). 
57 Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 2 Col L R 299 
(202).
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lature’s oversight tasks.58 In this vacuum of ex post political control, 
the need for courts to function as suppliers of additional oversight 
naturally increases. The apex court thus faces stronger pressures and 
incentives to devise more aggressive doctrines that serve as ex ante 
constraints and ex post controls to agencies when applied by the 
lower courts. Such doctrinal constraints, however, are more likely 
than not to focus on questions of fact, rather than questions of law. 
Recall that a polity with multiple effective vetogates is bound to wit-
ness the skyrocketing of statutory ambiguities. As a relative matter, 
specialized, well-equipped, and outcome-oriented agencies are more 
suitable candidates than generalist courts for the task of resolving 
almost endless system-wide statutory ambiguities for long-term pur-
poses, without causing the law-making system to grind to a halt. As 
a rule, courts are not entitled to preemptively promulgate sweeping 
and binding interpretations that clarify far-reaching statutory policy 
questions, like their agency counterparts. An apex court, residing 
in a multiple vetogates polity, intent on reducing the legislature’s 
agency costs on the one hand, and conserving the authority and 
resources of the lower courts on the other, has little realistic choice 
other than to devise doctrines that are aggressive but confined to the 
review of comparatively inconsequential agency factual and eviden-
tiary findings on a case by case basis.
The following theses may be derived from the preceding analysis:
.  Ceteris paribus, the greater the number of effective vetogates, 
the less likely an apex court will devise aggressive doctrines 
of judicial review of administrative statutory interpretation; 
and vice versa.
2.  Ceteris paribus, the greater the number of effective veto-
gates, the more likely an apex court will devise aggressive 
doctrines of judicial review of administrative findings of fact;  
and vice versa.
I I I .  A  H I S T O R I C A L  O V E R V I E W  O F  
M O D E R N  A N G L O - A M E R I C A N  
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  C O M M O N  L A W
Judicial review of administrative action in the United Kingdom 
and the United States has had much in common. Administrative 
law of both countries originated in the common law courts of early 
modern England, which in the seventeenth century began to reform 
58 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions 
43–32 (Norton 2d ed 200).
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their writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with a view to 
controlling official acts.59 Until the twentieth century, English and 
American courts also shared similar approaches to questions of law 
and fact.60 In England it was considered axiomatic that on ques-
tions of fact the administrative authority “is the master in its own 
house.”6 The province of the courts is rather to determine questions 
of law.62 Similarly, federal courts in the United States once gave 
little or no deference to statutory interpretation by agencies.63 The 
Supreme Court’s insistence that courts, not agencies, were entitled 
to discern the meaning of the law won congressional endorsement 
in the Administrative Procedure Act of 946 (APA),64 which codified 
over half a century of federal case law.65 The APA authorizes judicial 
review on questions of law and, to a much lesser extent, questions 
of fact.66 On questions of law §706 mandates that courts “shall de-
cide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action”; by contrast, respecting questions of fact, 
§706(2)(A) requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard came from the Supreme Court’s 
59 See Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Prob-
lems, Text, and Cases 5–6 (Wolters Kluwer 7th ed 20). 
60 H.W.R. Wade and Christopher F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 8 (Oxford 0th ed 
2009). 
6 Id at 229. 
62 In Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC, Lord Wilber-
force opined: “If a judgment requires, before it can be made, the existence of some 
facts, then although the evaluation of those facts is for the Secretary of State alone, 
the court must inquire whether those facts exist, and have been taken into account, 
whether the judgment has been upon a proper self-direction as to those facts, whether 
the judgment has not been made upon other facts which ought not to have been 
taken into account. If those requirements are not met, then the exercise of judgment, 
however bona fide it may be, becomes capable of challenge.” Secretary of State for 
Education and Science v Tameside MBC, [977] AC 04, 037.
63 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Col L 
Rev 20 (987); Richard L. Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 Geo 
L J 2225 (997). 
64 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Col L Rev 2080 
(990). 
65 McCubbins, et al, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol at 255 (cited in note 52).
66 William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L R 46 
(2008). 
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pre-APA, originally lenient, due process rulings,67 in which agen-
cies were not required to support their rulemaking with evidence, 
records, or statement of reasons.68  
Similarly, throughout the twentieth century, judicial review of 
administrative action in both countries expanded roughly within the 
same time frame, though in different ways. Britain’s involvement 
in the two World Wars ushered in a period of exceptionally strong 
executive government, corresponding to a period of judicial defer-
ence when the English courts followed Parliament in endorsing and 
supporting the Government’s authority and power to tackle national 
emergencies.69 Judicial review was at that time “little more than per-
functory.”70 This changed, however, in the 960s, when administra-
tive common law underwent a “revolution”7 which “transformed 
[it] exponentially,”72 unleashing a period of “unparalleled judicial 
creativity” during which “the range of bodies subject to judicial re-
view [were] much widened.”73 This did not happen overnight, but the 
“innovative” jurisprudence of the Law Lords “set the tone for all that 
was to follow.”74 All the same, their prevailing approach was “a cau-
tious one”75 that followed the orthodox rules of statutory interpreta-
tion and showed a “general executive-mindedness”;76 for instance, 
avoiding intrusive or probing reviews (let alone nullifications) of del-
egated legislation.77 
67 Kevin Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
in the United States, in C.F. Forsyth, et al, eds, Effective Judicial Review: A Corner-
stone of Good Governance 32 (Oxford 200).
68 Richard J. Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Inter-
pretations of Statutory Provisions, 4 Vand L R 30 (988). 
69 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 96 (Cambridge 
3d ed 2009).
70 Stanley A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 28 (Stevens 
3d ed 973). 
7 David Williams, Law and Administrative Discretion, 2 Ind J Global Legal Stud 
92 (994). 
72 Michael Supperstone and Lynne Knapman, Administrative Court Practice  
(Oxford 2008). 
73 Christopher F. Forsyth and Linda Whittle, Judicial Creativity and Judicial Le-
gitimacy in Administrative Law, 8 Canterbury L Rev 453 (2002).
74 Michael J. Beloff, The End of the Twentieth Century: The House of Lords 1982–
2000, in Louis Blom-Cooper, et al, eds, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876–2009 23 
(Oxford 2009).
75 Dickson, Judicial Activism in the House of Lords 1995–2007 at 367 (cited in 
note 7).
76 Helen Fenwick, et al, The Human Rights Act in Contemporary Context, in 
H. Fenwick, et al, eds, Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act  (Cam-
bridge 2007). 
77 See, for instance, Hoffman, La Roche and Co v Secretary of State for Trade, 
[975] AC 295.
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In America, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s court-packing plan 
threatened the Supreme Court credibly enough to induce it to adopt 
a generally deferential stance to the legality of New Deal admin-
istrative programs. The availability of judicial review was conse-
quently curtailed by the Court’s conspicuous deference to admin-
istrative agencies.78 In the twenty years after the enactment of the 
APA, the federal courts acquiesced in the growth of the post–New 
Deal administrative state,79 by allowing the nondelegation doctrine 
to fall into obscurity.80 Yet administrative common law has made a 
remarkable comeback since the late 960s, when the courts began to 
impose more stringent legal and procedural requirements on agency 
decision making.8 Today, the most important administrative law 
principles created or recognized by the US Supreme Court are not 
derived from the APA;82 it is hard to argue, as we shall see, that the 
APA authorizes blockbuster doctrines such as hard look review.83 
However, compared to the Law Lords, the Supreme Court has gener-
ally respected congressional preclusions of judicial review,84 except 
in constitutional cases.85 
Judicial review of administrative action in both the United King-
dom and the United States appears to have sprung up in tandem 
with the growth of the administrative state. In the words of former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the mushrooming of the administra-
tive state in the two countries has “meant that more and more of 
the goods and services on which people depend are made available 
through administrative proceedings of one type or another.”86 The 
functions of the British state began to ramify after the Second World 
War, and, notwithstanding the deregulatory agenda of the Thatcher 
premiership in the 980s, have continued to do so through the end of 
the twentieth century. Myriad agencies and nondepartmental public 
bodies have been created to pursue a gamut of public policy ends, 
vesting sweeping powers in administrators to implement countless 
78 Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 2 (cited in note 59).
79 Id at 23.
80 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 9 Yale L J 79 (2009).
8 Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 28 (cited in note 59).
82 Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
United States at 37 (cited in note 67).
83 Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law at 30 (cited in note 3).
84 See, for instance, Block v Community Nutrition Inst, 467 US 340 (984).
85 See, for instance, Johnson v Robison, 45 US 36 (974).
86 Sandra Day O’Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England 
and the United States, 27 Wm & Mary L Rev 643 (986).
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public (and even privatization) programs87 that impact the everyday 
lives of citizens.88 Resort to discretionary power has concurrently 
“exploded,”89 and discontent with administrative procedures accu-
mulated.90 The proliferation of administrative authorities has trig-
gered responses from Parliament, such as the “police-patrol” select 
committees set up in 979 to superintend the work of the major 
civil service departments. Parliament and the courts have increas-
ingly teamed up to control administrative powers.9 
In the United States, the twentieth century had seen Congress 
creating cabinet departments, cabinet-level agencies, independent reg-
ulatory commissions, federal corporations, independent bodies with-
 in cabinet departments, and so forth, to carry out the laws it enacts.92 
An “activist” era in regulatory policy had emerged by the late 960s 
or early 970s,93 as agencies expanded their range of action to include 
industrywide rate regulation, while administrative adjudication and 
rulemaking became increasingly the norm.94 Notably, independent 
agencies outside the structure of the President’s Cabinet multiplied.95 
Agencies resorted to informal notice-and-comment rulemaking with 
greater frequency, aggravating concerns that they might give inad-
equate consideration to the interests of all stakeholders.96 Many be-
lieved they were no longer acting “in the public interest,” due to 
“capture” by the very industries they were supposed to regulate.97 
Some courts, especially the DC Circuit, were deeply distrustful 
of the growth of regulation, and responded by developing the hard 
look doctrine, which demanded reasoned explanations and adequate 
87 See Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration (cited in note 47).
88 Matthew Flinders, Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in British Central 
Government, 54 Parliamentary Affairs 54 (200); Paul Craig, Political Constitution-
alism and the Judicial Role: A Response, 9 Intl J Const L 2 (20). 
89 Mark Elliott, Beatson, Matthews, and Elliott’s Administrative Law: Text and 
Materials 3 (Oxford 4th ed 20). 
90 Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law at 3 (cited in note 60).
9 Cane, Administrative Law at 40 (cited in note 55). 
92 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 83 Col L Rev 583–84 (984). 
93 Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance at 2 (cited in note ). 
94 Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi Kent L 
Rev 092 (997).
95 Martin Shapiro, A Comparison of US and European Independent Agencies, in 
Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law at 304 (cited 
in note 3).
96 Bob Allen, Rationalizing Hard Look Review after the Fact, 22 Harv L Rev 92 
(2009). 
97 Maxwell L. Stearns and Todd J. Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Applica-
tions in Law 377 (Thomson Reuters 2009); Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 Wash L Rev 438 (2009). 
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evidence from agencies under scrutiny.98 Congress also proceeded 
to enact clearer guidelines for agencies to follow, ring-fencing them 
with detailed procedural requirements and deadlines.99 
The Law Lords’ expansion of the “width” of the applicability 
of administrative law together with their maintenance of, at best, 
a “shallow” judicial penetration cohere with the proposition that 
they were much more receptive to review of questions of law than of 
fact, whereas the Supreme Court’s “narrow” and “deep” doctrines 
evidence the opposite. The problem for the next section, then, is 
to explain why the Law Lords have rested content with orthodoxy, 
while the Supreme Court’s rulings maintain but a “tenuous connec-
tion” to the APA.00 
I V .  E X P L A I N I N G  D O C T R I N A L  A N T I T H E S I S
A. Vetogates and Judicial Review of Questions  
of Law in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is the paradigm low-n vetogates polity;0 in-
deed, among liberal democracies, the Westminster model has the 
fewest vetogates and is capable of the most decisive action. Such 
a system, combining a parliamentary system with plurality vot-
ing and strong party discipline, tends to yield to the winning party 
disproportionate governing majorities in Parliament, ones, more-
over, unconstrained by federalism, a codified constitution, super-
majority voting rules, or judicial review of legislation.02 In British 
constitutional theory, parliamentary sovereignty is an organic rule 
the importance of which could hardly be overstated. Leaving the com-
plexities of membership of the European Union aside, there are for-
mally only three vetogates in the United Kingdom: the House of Com-
mons, the House of Lords, and the Monarch, but only one of them 
is effective, namely, the Commons. The Commons is “now virtually 
unchecked,” the Lords having long ago lost their power to veto leg-
98 Matthew J. Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development 
of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 Geo L J 2599 (2002).
99 Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 24 (cited in note 59). 
00 See Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
in the United States at 38 (cited in note 67). 
0 Iain McLean, What’s Wrong with the British Constitution?, 89 (Oxford 200). 
02 Francis Fukuyama, Do Defective Institutions Explain the Development Gap 
between the United States and Latin America?, in F. Fukuyama, ed, Falling Behind: 
Explaining the Development Gap between Latin America and the United States 94 
(Oxford 2008).
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islation, following the Parliamentary Acts of 9 and 949, while 
the Monarch’s prerogatives have atrophied throughout the twenti-
eth century.03 Thus, the lower chamber has, in essence, retained the 
only effective veto in the polity.04 Yet even this veto is a weak one, 
as the Commons majority governs through an inner circle known 
as “the Government,” which has consolidated its political ascen-
dancy over all other members of the Commons to such an extent 
that its will is tantamount to the will of Parliament for practical 
purposes.05
The Government, chaired by the Leader of the Party which holds 
most seats in the Commons who doubles as the Prime Minister, 
dominates agenda setting in Parliament.06 While ordinary “back-
bench” members of Parliament (MPs) may submit bills, the Govern-
ment “frontbench” originates nearly all legislative proposals that suc-
ceed. In each annual session of Parliament the Government adopts 
a program of legislation to give effect to policies collectively agreed 
ex ante, often corresponding to the governing party’s election mani-
festo.07 The Commons’ vetogate is so weak that, in urgent cases, an 
ordinary public bill can be passed in a few days or even hours.08 This 
is so even for constitutional reforms: on June 2, 2003, the Prime 
Minister’s office announced in the midst of a Cabinet reshuffle that 
a “Supreme Court” would replace the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords as the United Kingdom’s final court of appeal. No 
consultations were held, not even with the Law Lords. In merely 
three years, the United Kingdom had reformed an integral part of its 
entrenched constitutional structure, without any of the contentious 
03 Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 Oxford J Legal 
Stud 42 (202).
04 Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret 3 (Cambridge 987). 
05 Save for those rather infrequent circumstances when an alienated faction of 
backbenchers combined with the opposition to obstruct the Government’s agenda or 
bring down the Government with a resolution of no confidence. In theory, minority 
or coalition Governments open up more effective vetogates in the UK law-making 
system, but these are a rarity in Westminster, and generally do survive to make last-
ing impact. Between 900 and 200 the United Kingdom experienced a total of only 
eleven years of minority governments and thirteen years of coalition governments, 
with predominating interludes of majority governments in between. It is normally 
relatively easy to maintain the confidence of the House of Commons majority. See 
Anthony King, Ministerial Autonomy in Britain, in M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle, eds, 
Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government 208 (Cambridge 994).
06 McCubbins, Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle at 33 (cited in 
note 8).
07 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution 
459 (Cambridge 7th ed 20). 
08 Id at 462.
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public debates, controversies or conflicts that would have befallen 
other liberal democracies.09 
Under this “elective dictatorship,”0 legislation may be enacted 
by the “Queen in Parliament” (agreed by the Commons and the 
Lords with royal assent); by the House of Commons acting on the 
Parliamentary Acts of 9 and 949 (bypassing the House of Lords 
but with royal assent); or by the Government (as delegated legisla-
tion). Delegated legislation nowadays can be six times as long as 
the Acts of Parliament promulgated in the same year (for example, 
2008), but this by no means evidences the formation of any new 
vetogate, because, given the unity of legislature and executive, the 
choice of primary or delegated legislation as the vehicle of policy 
remains firmly in the hands of the Commons majority.2 The Leg-
islative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 §, for instance, popularly 
pilloried as the “abolition of Parliament bill,”3 ceded to Govern-
ment ministers “potentially very broad” powers to amend or repeal 
legislation by orders in council if perceived “burdens” arise.4 Del-
egated legislation is a “non-problem”:5 the lack of public scrutiny 
has led to no system-wide dissatisfaction.6 Consistent with the 
theory of vetogates, UK executive agencies, though numerous, have 
played little role in pronouncing authoritative interpretations of law 
or developing core policy.7 In practice they are “satellites” of the 
Government.8
It was in this institutional climate that England’s modern admin-
istrative law developed. The Law Lords preferred the supervisory 
model, in which administrative authorities must try to answer all 
questions of law correctly; in the event of disagreement, the courts’ 
interpretation prevails.9 Of course, in practice authorities must 
make sense of the law without knowing how the Law Lords will ulti-
09 See Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Les-
sons for American States?, 34 Fordham Urban L J 387 (2007). 
0 See Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (London 978).
 Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law at 733 (cited in note 60). 
2 Turpin and Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution at 468 (cited 
in note 07). 
3 Id at 29.
4 Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law 99 (Oxford 202).
5 Michael Asimow, Delegated Legislation: United States and United Kingdom, 
3 Oxford J Legal Stud 267 (983).
6 Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law at 692 (cited 
in note 40).
7 Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law at 4 (cited in note 60).
8 Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law at 272 (cited in note 0).
9 Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law 474 (Oxford 20). 
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mately decide.20 The English doctrine on questions of law requires 
the administrative authorities to provide a “point estimate” of the 
“correct” legal answer they believe will be approved by the review 
court, instead of operating in the wide “policy space” typically af-
forded them on questions of fact. In one of their earliest landmark 
decisions of the twentieth century, Padfield v Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Food,2 the Law Lords asserted the judiciary’s 
supremacy over all questions of law, that the “construction [of the 
policy and objects of an Act] is always a matter of law for the court.” 
They reaffirmed this supremacy in Re Racal Communication Ltd,22 
holding that it is “a matter for courts of law to resolve in fulfillment 
of [administrative tribunals’] constitutional role as interpreters of 
the written law and expounders of the common law and rules of 
equity,” and in Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for 
the Civil Service.23 
Since then, the Law Lords have consistently upheld the funda-
mental principle that administrative authorities can use their pow-
ers only for the purposes for which they have been expressly or 
impliedly conferred.24 R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page,25 
echoing the earlier judgment of Anisminic v Foreign Compensa-
tion Commission,26 set out “the fundamental principle . . . that the 
courts will intervene to ensure that the powers of public decision-
making bodies are exercised lawfully.” The Law Lords’ character-
ization of all errors of law as jurisdictional—as in Lord Irvine’s lead 
judgment in Boddington v British Transport Police27—implies a 
“hard-edged” review whereby the court will not hesitate to substi-
tute its view for that of the administrator.28 
20 Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law at 8 (cited in note 0).
2 Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [968] AC 997, 030.
22 Re Racal Communication Ltd [98] AC 374, 382–83.
23 Whether an administrative authority has correctly understood the law regu-
lating its decision-making power “is par excellence a justiciable question to be de-
cided . . . by . . . the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable.” 
Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, [985] AC 374, 
40–. 
24 R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex parte Chetnik Developments Ltd, [988] AC 858 
872; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham 
LBC, [99]  AC 52, 597.
25 R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page, [993] AC 682, 70–02.
26 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission, [969] 2 AC 47.
27 “[A]ny misdirection in law would render the decision . . . a nullity.” Bodding-
ton v British Transport Police, [999] 2 AC 43, 54.
28 Elliott, Beatson, Matthews, and Elliott’s Administrative Law at 49 (cited in 
note 89).
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In reality, of course, it is not possible for courts to convincingly 
pinpoint in every single instance one correct answer to questions 
of law arising from ambiguous statutory language. Lord Mustill in 
R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire 
Transport29 was forced to concede that the courts may override 
“only if the decision maker has adopted an unreasonable definition 
of the term when the statutory provision under consideration is 
extremely vague.” South Yorkshire Transport may appear to herald 
the triumph of the American approach to review of questions of law 
in England.30 But there are important differences between South 
Yorkshire Transport and the rule of deference in Chevron. Lord Ir-
vine comments extrajudicially that South Yorkshire Transport did 
not undo the general rule that the courts retain final authority on all 
matters of statutory construction, save for the most exceptional cir-
cumstances.3 A post–South Yorkshire Transport review court will 
still pass judgment on the meaning of an ambiguous statutory term 
even if the administrator has real expertise over the issue.32 Con-
sistent with the theory, South Yorkshire Transport has not attained 
anywhere near the paradigmatic status of Chevron, the Law Lords 
basing no doctrines on it for the next two decades. In R v British 
Broadcasting Corporation (Appellants), ex parte Prolife Alliance 
(Respondents)33 the majority rejected any idea of deference in mat-
ters of law due to “its overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious 
concession.” The “point estimate” approach to any question of law, 
that “[t]here is a right or a wrong answer” was upheld by the nascent 
UK Supreme Court in R(A) v Croydon LBC.34
That the British polity has only one effective vetogate means that 
House of Commons majorities are able to enact and repeal laws 
almost at will. As Parliament, they set forth fundamental principles 
in acts, and as the Government, they flesh out the details of these 
principles in delegated legislation. Despite the growth of the admin-
istrative state, majorities have felt little need to delegate sweeping 
statutory interpretative power to administrative agencies insulated 
29 R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport, 
[993]  WLR 23, 32. The “extremely vague” term at issue was “substantial part of 
the United Kingdom” contained in Section 64(3) of the Fair Trading Act 973.
30 Elliott, Beatson, Matthews, and Elliott’s Administrative Law at 6 (cited in 
note 89).
3 Lord Irvine, Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the 
English Legal System 57 (Oxford 2003). 
32 Craig, Judicial Review of Questions of Law at 452 (cited in note 0). 
33 R v British Broadcasting Corporation (Appellants), ex parte Prolife Alliance 
(Respondents), UKHL 23, at paras 75–76 (2003).
34 R(A) v Croydon LBC, UKSC 8, at para 27 (2009).
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from Parliament and Government. Even when this is done, the 
majority has little trouble reversing a rogue decision; hence agencies 
of rank below the cabinet normally wield no interpretive powers of 
long-term consequence. Compared to the United States, resolving 
questions of law is of far less importance in the United Kingdom 
than the resolving questions of fact, discretion, and policy. In line 
with the theses of Section II, the capacity of Commons majorities 
to resolve fundamental disagreements both before and after enact-
ment, reducing administrative authorities to mere fact finders,35 
neither pressurized nor dissuaded the Law Lords to abandon their 
entrenched belief that “residual” statutory ambiguities may be effi-
ciently resolved by the courts. Consequently, there is little need to 
concede their monopoly of questions of law. 
B. Vetogates and Judicial Review of Questions  
of Law in the United States 
The US law-making system, characterized by bicameralism and pre-
sentment of bills to the President, enshrines the principle of checks 
and balances, deliberately incorporating many vetogates. According 
to William Eskridge, at least nine vetogates allow a bill to be struck 
out without need of a majority vote against it: () the relevant House 
committee, (2) the House Rules Committee, (3) House floor con-
sideration, (4) the relevant Senate committee, (5) unanimous con-
sent agreement, (6) Senate filibuster, (7) House-Senate conference 
committee, (8) conference bill consideration by House and Senate, 
and (9) presentment to the President.36 Not all of these vetogates 
have always been “effective”; for instance, the Textbook Congress 
of the mid-twentieth century habitually ratified committee deci-
sions on the floor. With the advent in the 970s of divided govern-
ment and polarized parties,37 however, committee decisions came 
increasingly under scrutiny and amendment by legislators off the 
relevant committee.38 The multiplicity of vetogates subjected regu-
latory bills to fierce debate, and the final output, shaped by compro-
mise between parties, regions, interest groups, and manipulation by 
committee chairmen, often bore little resemblance to the original 
proposal. Congress’s capacity to legislate with precision waned in 
35 Craig, Judicial Review of Questions of Law at 463 (cited in note 0).
36 Eskridge, Vetogates and American Public Law at 4 (cited in note 30).
37 Id.
38 Matthew D. McCubbins, et al, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bar-
gains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo L J 720 (992). 
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proportion to the number of vetogates.39 The many economic, politi-
cal and social problems of the United States could hardly be resolved 
in the teeth of so many effective vetogates without substantial au-
thority being delegated to agencies to fill in the unresolved details40 
and adapt general terms to new circumstances.4 Ultimately, broad 
delegation to the executive, as Justice Scalia reckons, is the “hall-
mark” of the modern administrative state.42 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron USA Inc v Natural 
Resources Defense Council43 is a kind of “counter-Marbury” for the 
administrative state,44 and has become the single most cited deci-
sion in American administrative law.45 Its central doctrine of judi-
cial deference to agency interpretations of law has been universally 
endorsed by Congress, courts and agencies.46 Justice Stevens set out 
the famous two-part test: “the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress . . . if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” 
a court, according to him, “may not substitute its own construction 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.” 
After more than twenty years, Chevron remains “the undisputed 
starting point” for studying the distribution of authority between 
federal courts and agencies.47 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn 
confirm empirically that since Chevron statutory interpretation by 
agencies have prevailed about 70 percent of the time before the Su-
preme Court.48 The Court has, however, sought to impose some reg-
39 David S. Rubenstein, Relative Checks: Towards Optimal Control of Adminis-
trative Power, 5 Wm & Mary L Rev 275 (200).
40 Charles H. Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 Geo Wash 
L Rev 479 (986).
4 Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A 
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 
96 Nw U L Rev 239 (2002); Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption at 455 (cited 
in note 66). 
42 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
989 Duke L J 56 (989). 
43 Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 842–44 
(984).
44 Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron at 29 (cited in note 64).
45 Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
United States at 39 (cited in note 67). 
46 Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small 
75 (Oxford 2007).
47 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 88 (2006). 
48 William N. Eskridge and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New Amer-
ican Constitution 278 (Yale 200). 
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ularity on the process (but not the end result) of agency statutory 
construction: in United States v Mead Corporation49 it held that 
Chevron deference applies only to statutes whereby “Congress del-
egated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law.” The year before, it had decided in Christensen v Har-
ris50 that “interpretations such as those in opinion letters. . . lack of 
the force of law. . . ” Mead sought to encourage resort to notice-and-
comment by agencies in their process of de facto law making, yet 
without erecting new vetogates.5 Nevertheless, informal agency 
statutory constructions will not automatically receive de novo re-
view even after Mead, as the deferential rule in Skidmore52 still 
prevails. 
The Chevron rule was reinforced by National Cable & Telecom-
munications Association v Brand X Internet Services,53 where the 
majority went a “step further than Chevron”54 to require federal 
judges to subordinate their own prior interpretations of federal stat-
utes to later agency decisions. In Mayo Foundation for Medical Edu-
cation and Research v United States55 the Court held that “agency 
inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework.” And in Talk Amer-
ica, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co56 the Court ruled that defer-
ence should normally be accorded to an agency’s interpretation of 
its regulations “even in a legal brief.”
The Supreme Court’s framework for reviewing questions of law 
in administrative cases enables the Court to maintain “a workable 
relationship with Congress,” in the extrajudicial words of Justice 
Breyer.57 It grants agencies a “policy space” to make a range of tech-
nocratic and democratic judgments, without having to make a point 
49 United States v Mead Corporation, 533 US 28, 226–27 (200).
50 Christensen v Harris, 529 US 576, 587 (2000).
5 Nathan Alexander Sales and Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chev-
ron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U Ill L Rev 497 
(2009).
52 Courts must take account of the expertise possessed by the agency and the 
persuasiveness of the agency interpretation in question. Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 
US 34, 39–40 (944).
53 National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Ser-
vices, 545 US 967, 982 (2005). 
54 Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Conun-
drum of a Divided Supreme Court, 6 Emory L J 8 (20).
55 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v United States, 3 
S Ct 704, 7 (20).
56 Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 3 S Ct 2254, 2268 (20).
57 Stephen G. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 5 (Vintage 
200).
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estimate of statutory meaning, as in England.58 In brief, Congress’s 
incapacity to control statutory construction on a grand scale has been 
explicitly recognized in the jurisprudence of the Court,59 which on 
the one hand liberates agencies to update statutes in light of cutting- 
edge scientific knowledge,60 without interference from judges, who 
as generalists have little experience in economic, scientific, or policy 
affairs,6 and on the other, liberates judges to conserve scarce time 
and intellectual resources without expending enormous judicial capi-
tal on the determination of what skeletal statutes really “mean” or 
on the invention of robust justifications of administrative interpre-
tive choices.62 Congress sometimes delegates far-reaching powers 
to agencies with but minimal statutory specifications.63 It would 
always be difficult and often impossible for reviewing courts to mea-
sure the exact extent to which agency interpretations deviate from 
open-ended or nonexistent statutory content, estimate the agency 
costs this imposes on Congress, then respond accordingly.
C. Vetogates and Judicial Review of Questions  
of Fact in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, Parliament holds the Government to ac-
count mainly through scrutiny by select committees, questions on 
the floor, and investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration. A minister who loses the confidence of the Com-
mons through personal or departmental fault may be asked to resign 
and return to the backbenches.64 The complexion of parliamentary 
watchdog bodies reflects the Commons as a whole;65 for example, 
select committees and their chairs are typically dominated by the 
governing majority. Thus, when one says the Government is ac-
countable to Parliament, one is really saying that one group of MPs 
belonging to the parliamentary majority and holding Government 
58 Yehonatan Givati and Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsis-
tent Agency Statutory Interpretation, 40 J Legal Stud 86 (20). 
59 Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath at 305 (cited in note 68).
60 Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 278 (cited in note 48). 
6 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 Admin L Rev 754 (2006).
62 Connor N. Raso and William N. Eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, Not a Prec-
edent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 
0 Col L Rev 736 (200). 
63 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Mak-
ing, 08 Mich L Rev 35 (200). 
64 Andrew Le Sueur, The Nature, Powers, and Accountability of Central Govern-
ment, in Feldman, ed, Oxford Principles of English Law at 9–92 (cited in note 2).
65 Adam Tomkins, Public Law 62 (Oxford 2003).
This content downloaded from 147.008.230.158 on September 28, 2016 20:39:26 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Eric C. Ip 171
office is accountable to another group of MPs belonging to the same 
majority but not holding Government office.66 
The Commons majority has more capacity to monitor admin-
istrative behavior than the US Congress has, mainly through MPs 
serving as Government ministers.67 The fate of the Financial Ser-
vices Authority (FSA) amply evidences how decisively a majority 
can act to right administrative errors. The FSA was set up pursu-
ant to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as a regulatory 
agency independent of Parliament and Government, vested with 
impressive (by British standards) rulemaking and adjudicative pow-
ers to promote market confidence, protect consumers, and reduce 
financial crime. Because it derived its operating budget entirely from 
the firms it regulated, it was fiscally autonomous as well.68 In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–09, however, the FSA was 
faulted for failure to discharge its supervisory duties to contain the 
damage caused by the crisis. In 200 the newly elected Conservative- 
Liberal Coalition Government vowed to abolish the FSA.69 The 
Financial Services Act 202 was swiftly enacted to that end, with 
effect as of April 203.
UK Prime Ministers alone wield immense powers to reallocate 
responsibilities between departments, create new departments, and 
abolish or rebrand them; for instance, after the Home Office mis-
handled the deportation of foreign national prisoners in 2006, Prime 
Minister Blair summarily stripped the office of responsibility for the 
Prison Service, giving it to a new Ministry of Justice.70 Ministers 
often interlope in the minutiae of nationalized industry and execu-
tive agencies’ daily affairs,7 a practice finally formally recognized 
by the Public Bodies Act 20, which legitimizes Government min-
isters through delegated legislation to abolish, combine, and real-
locate powers among a gamut of administrative authorities listed in 
five schedules.
66 Id at 64. In 2008, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, set up in 
973, scrutinized 486 statutory instruments, and draw the special attention of each 
house to fifty-nine of them, 4 percent. The committee monitors departments to deter-
mine the action taken on instruments in relation to which the committee has drawn 
special attention. See Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of 
Common Law Constitutionalism, 23 Oxford J Legal Stud 443 (2005).
67 Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law at 693 (cited 
in note 40).
68 Jaime Arancibia, Judicial Review of Commercial Regulation 76 (Oxford 20). 
69 Tony Prosser, Regulation and Legitimacy, in J. Jowell & D. Oliver, eds, The 
Changing Constitution 39–20 (Oxford 7th ed 20).
70 Elliott and Thomas, Public Law at 3 (cited in note 9).
7 Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law at 272 (cited in note 0).
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Unsurprisingly, the increased readiness of the Law Lords since 
the 960s to review questions of law has not been paralleled by a 
corresponding relaxation in their approach to questions of fact;72 
continuing to disallow review of administrative decisions solely on 
the basis of error in findings of fact.73 In R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja74 Lord Wilberforce ruled 
that questions of fact may not be reviewed save for the relatively 
few instances where “questions of liberty and allegations of decep-
tion” are involved. A few years later, R v Hillingdon LBC, ex parte 
Puhlhofer75 propounded a Chevron-like rule—not for questions of 
law, but for questions of fact. R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex parte 
Begum76 confirmed that questions of fact “can only be challenged 
on judicial review if it can be shown to be Wednesbury unreason-
able.”77 Recently, in R(A) v Croydon LBC,78 Justice Baroness Hale 
placed a heavy evidentiary burden on challengers of administrative 
decisions to demonstrate unreasonableness prima facie and, there-
after, a light one on the administrative authority to rebut its alleged 
unreasonableness at the hearing.79 
The Law Lords further circumscribed the scope of reasonable-
ness review across a number of policy domains not because the old 
approach was too deferential, but because it was not deferential 
enough. The more deferentiable included inter alia the allocation of 
central government funds to local authorities,80 social and economic 
72 David Blundell, Material Error of Fact—Where Are We Now?, 9 Jud Rev 36 
(2004).
73 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte A, [999] 2 AC 330, 
344–45.
74 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khawaja, [984] 
AC 74, 05.
75 “Where the existence or non-existence of a fact” is left up to the judgment of 
an administrative authority, and “involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvi-
ous to the debatable to the just conceivable”, the courts should not intervene unless 
the authority has been “acting perversely.” R v Hillingdon LBC, ex parte Puhlhofer, 
[986] AC 484, 58.
76 R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex parte Begum, [993] AC 509, 67–8.
77 Such a “Wednesbury unreasonable” administrative decision is one “which is 
so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible 
person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at 
it.” Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, [985] AC 
at 408.
78 R(A) v Croydon LBC [2009], UKSC 8, para 26.
79 Paul Daly, Wednesbury’s Reason and Structure, 20 Pub L 254 (20).
80 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Hammersmith and Ful-
ham LBC, [99]  AC 52.
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policy,8 immigration,82 and national security.83 Although the Law 
Lords did abandon the orthodox position that it lay within an au-
thority’s competence to err even if a factual finding is wholly unsup-
ported by evidence,84 they insisted that the evidence need not be 
substantial.85 To qualify as “evidence” in this sense, assertions of 
record merely have to be “consistent with the finding” and “not log-
ically self-contradictory.”86 
The cumulative effect of these doctrines is for English courts to 
accept the breadth of discretion and autonomy vested in administra-
tive and regulatory agencies.87 Unlike their US counterpart, the Brit-
ish apex court has not demanded expertise-led administrative fact 
finding or policymaking.88 Indeed, the issue of an administrative 
agency’s expertise has been assumed away as a question for Parlia-
ment, not for courts. The doctrinal trajectories of the Law Lords on 
judicial review of questions of fact cohere with the positive theory 
of vetogates. The House of Commons can resolutely correct admin-
istrative failures on its own, even those stemming from inaccurate 
findings of fact and evidential analysis. A Commons majority can 
rely on Government ministers to sanction malfeasant administra-
tors, and can acquire supplementary information to serve its inter-
ests from a plethora of monitoring devices—from “police patrols” 
to “fire alarms” and “fire extinguishers.” Parliamentary demand 
for judicial review has consequently remained slight. And the UK 
Parliament can, and sometimes does, reverse the effects of court 
judgments in ways not replicable by Congress.89 There was little 
demand or room for the Law Lords to devise activist doctrines of 
review of questions of fact. After all, the most serious problems of 
the day have been resolved by Parliament sooner or later.
8 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Nottinghamshire CC, 
[986] AC 240.
82 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay, [987] 
AC 54.
83 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, [200] 3 WLR 877.
84 Christopher F. Forsyth and Emma Dring, The Final Frontier: The Emergence of 
Material Error of Fact as a Ground for Judicial Review, in Forsyth, et al, eds, Effective 
Judicial Review at 249 (cited in note 67).
85 Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC, [2003] 2 AC 430, para 99.
86 Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd, [984] AC 808, 82.
87 Prosser, Regulation and Legitimacy at 32–33 (cited in note 69). 
88 Catherine Donnelly, Participation and Expertise: Judicial Attitudes in Com-
parative Perspective, in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth, eds, Comparative Adminis-
trative Law at 357 (cited in note 3).
89 Iain McLean, Rational Choice in British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and 
Manipulation from Peel to Blair 9 (Oxford 200). 
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D. Vetogates and Judicial Review of Questions  
of Fact in the United States
Override of agency decisions, whether through rulemaking or adjudi-
cation, is constrained by vetogates inside and outside Congress, weak-
ening the credibility of such a threat.90 Consider the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA),9 which purports to empower Congress to over-
ride any federal agency rule by a “resolution of disapproval” without 
need of modifying statutory language.92 Such a resolution, however, 
like ordinary legislation, must pass both houses and be presented 
to the President, winning a two-thirds majority of Congress in case 
of a veto. Inevitably, Congress cannot do much to threaten agen-
cies that dare to defy the CRA,93 which has been invoked success-
fully only once, to revoke the Clinton ergonomics rule, as of 202.94 
Of course, Congress may sanction an agency by less formal means 
such as limiting budgets, targeting specific programs through ear-
marks and riders, using informal signals and threats, and deploying 
other standard techniques of legislative oversight.95 Congress has 
set up “police patrols” such as oversight committees to hold hear-
ings to nudge agencies to “behave,” and created “fire alarms” under 
the APA of 946, the Freedom of Information Act of 966,96 and 
the Government in the Sunshine Act of 97697 to empower interest 
groups and constituencies to find out what agencies are doing, and 
make this information available to Congress.98
Partisan polarization in Congress has proliferated effective veto-
gates, which has in turn aggravated congressional fragmentation. 
The minority might agree with an agency’s erratic decision and con-
90 Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: 
A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S Cal L Rev 434 (996). 
9 5 USC §§ 80–08 (2006).
92 Rubenstein, Relative Checks at 2206 (cited in note 39).
93 Sean D. Croston, Congress and the Courts Close Their Eyes: The Continuing 
Abdication of the Duty to Review Agencies’ Noncompliance with the Congressional 
Review Act, 62 Admin L Rev 9 (200).
94 Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Ap-
pointment: The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protec-
tion, 25 Harv L Rev 832 (202). 
95 Jeffrey S. Hill and James E. Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions: A 
Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J L Econ & Org 390 
(99).
96 5 USC § 552.
97 5 USC § 552b.
98 Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Political Theory of the 
Reformation of Administrative Law, Research Symposium: 25 Years of Law and Pos-
itive Political Theory: Past, Present and the Future, Searle Center, Northwestern Law 
6 (October 7–8, 200). 
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nive to circumscribe congressional oversight, while the majority, 
who might have reversed it, is preoccupied with pressing constitu-
ent concerns and more salient policy issues of the day.99 The policy 
preferences of oversight committees may be tilted toward special 
interests and fail to reflect the aggregate preferences of the majority, 
attenuating the effect of fire alarms pulled by constituents at large.200 
Interest in a given issue is apt to die on the committee system vine 
before gathering adequate support, thus undermining police patrol 
oversight as some agencies get disproportionately missed compared 
to others.20 
The most powerful political weapon is the process of appoint-
ment and dismissal,202 as seen in the actions taken by the UK Par-
liament and Prime Minister against perceived agency malfeasance. 
Unlike their British counterparts congressional majorities can exert 
little control over the executive apparatus, even during periods 
of unified government. All administrative agencies, executive or 
independent, have oversight relationships with the President, who 
is independently elected and does not hold office subject to Con-
gress’s “confidence.”203 What is more, President and Congress are 
frequently at loggerheads; divided government has been the norm for 
at least a generation.204 Congress pressures the President on whom 
to appoint to executive posts so as to nudge administrative action 
in certain directions,205 but presidents too increasingly put in place 
mechanisms designed to achieve more control over regulatory agen-
cies, like Nixon’s Quality of Life review group, Carter’s regulatory 
analysis executive order, and Reagan’s and Clinton’s comprehensive 
review of agencies by the Office of Management and Budget, contin-
ued by George W. Bush and Obama.206 On one hand, congressional 
review of agency rules has not sufficed to counteract the President’s 
growing influence;207 on the other, presidential oversight may under-
mine the readiness of Congress to monitor agencies, especially as 
99 Croston, Congress and the Courts Close Their Eyes at 90 (cited in note 93).
200 Rubenstein, Relative Checks at 2209 (cited in note 39).
20 Note, Oversight and Insight: Legislative Review of Agencies and Lessons from 
the States, 2 Harv L Rev 66 (2007). 
202 Shepsle, Analyzing Politics at 429 (cited in note 58).
203 Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government at 583 (cited in note 92).
204 Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 280 (cited in note 48). 
205 Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L Rev 68 
(2006).
206 Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review at 36 
(cited in note 80).
207 Jack M. Beermann, The Turn toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B U L 
Rev 758 (2009). 
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electoral campaign incentives stampede most members of Congress 
toward shifting blame for policy failure onto the executive.208 
Against this backdrop of congressional incapacity to exert “more 
than occasional oversight of independent agencies proceedings,”209 
the Supreme Court has affirmed and developed “more daring [and] 
active” doctrines of judicial review of fact-finding.20 The Court has 
opted for an appellate model of judicial review, focusing on the sub-
stance of agency decisions,2 as distinct from the Law Lords’ supervi-
sory model.22 Agency fact finding in the United States is scrutinized 
under a “substantial evidence” standard.23 The hard look doctrine 
authorizes courts to strike down agency action not well supported 
by the facts.24 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe25 
the Supreme Court ruled that while “the ultimate standard of review 
is a narrow one,” judicial inquiry into the fact-finding process is to 
be a “substantial . . . searching . . . careful . . . thorough . . . probing 
[and] in-depth review.” Subsequently, the Court held that adminis-
trative findings of fact qualify for judicial deference only if they have 
a “substantial basis in fact”26 and scientific determination.27 
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States v 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co,28 the Supreme Court 
revamped the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard; unlike 
Wednesbury review in the United Kingdom, hard look review in 
the United States requires internal, interdecisional, and intertempo-
ral consistency in the agency’s reasoning processes,29 and obligates 
the agency to document its reasons for its decisions; compile evi-
208 McCubbins, et al, The Political Economy of Law at 702 (cited in note 9). 
209 Carl McGowan, A Reply to Judicialization, 2 Duke L J 224 (986).
20 Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Pow-
ers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 3 Intl Rev Law & Econ 369 
(993). 
2 Cane, Administrative Law at 29 (cited in note 55). 
22 Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law,  Col L Rev 002 (20). 
23 David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va L Rev 36 (200).
24 Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 
United States at 322 (cited in note 67).
25 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 40 US 402, 45–20 (97).
26 Federal Power Commission v Florida Power & Light Co, 404 US 453 (972).
27 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 462 
US 87 (983).
28 According to the Court, an agency is “arbitrary and capricious” if it has, among 
other things, “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United 
States v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 43 (983). 
29 Pierce, et al, Administrative Law and Process at 25 (cited in note 48).
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dence supporting its reasons; consider, analyze, and reject contrary 
evidence; and consider, analyze, and reject alternatives to its pre-
ferred policy based on the available evidence.220 Hard look review 
has remained essentially stable over the two decades since State 
Farm,22 as witness Massachusetts v EPA.222 Although Justice Sca-
lia’s opinion in FCC v Fox Television Stations, Inc223 might be read 
as a relaxation of the State Farm doctrine,224 the Court regressed to 
the mean in Judulang v Holder.225 
The multiplicity of effective vetogates in the American polity in-
flicts exponential oversight transaction costs on congressional ma-
jorities; attempts by Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions 
have by the same token not always been credible either.226 The res-
olution of questions of law and of fact in the United States often 
raises complex technical issues that courts are seldom equipped to 
deal with. In a specifically American context, however, the empha-
sis on reviewing questions of fact avoids the need to resolve large 
numbers of statutory ambiguities with far-reaching, long-term sig-
nificance, and avoids impairing the workability of the law-making 
system. Such a framework may have impelled, if not also persuaded, 
the federal courts to devise doctrines of review that make them into 
imperfect surrogates of Congress. Hard look review does risk admin-
istrative costs, inefficiencies, delays, and ossification of rulemak-
ing,227 but it also serves as an ex post corrective and ex ante deterrent 
to biased or confused agency decisions made under the pressures 
of particularistic interest groups.228 It increases the likelihood that 
220 Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Ra-
tionality, and Reasons, 6 Duke L J 89–20 (202). 
22 Miles and Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? at 764 (cited in note 5).
222 Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497 (2007).
223 Agencies “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for 
the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” FCC v Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc, 29 S Ct 800, 8 (2009).
224 Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review at 0 
(cited in note 80).
225 Justice Kagan, reciting the familiar State Farm formula, affirmed that neither 
“repetition” nor “consistency” is a defense that justifies “arbitrary and capricious” 
administrative decisions. Judulang v Holder, 32 S Ct 476, 483–88 (202).
226 Matthew D. McCubbins, et al, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Ad-
ministrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75(2) Va L Rev 445 
(989). 
227 Allen, Rationalizing Hard Look Review after the Fact at 929 (cited in 
note 96).
228 Miles and Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? at 809 (cited in 
note 5).
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agencies’ choices will mirror the policy preferences of the overall 
polity, without need of additional political oversight.229 Congress 
appears to have recognized the availability of judicial review as a 
prerequisite for transferring rulemaking functions to independent 
agencies.230 
V .  D I S C U S S I O N  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N
To substantiate their claim that “there appears to be more conver-
gence between the US and the UK systems in term of reasonableness 
review than one would have predicted,” Magill and Ortiz hold out 
“judicial culture” as a superior explanation for “the existence and 
shape of judicial review of administrative action.”23 By “judicial 
culture” they mean the considerations motivating judges as they 
develop administrative law, that is, to maintain a certain regular-
ity and fairness in administrative decision making or to vindicate 
norms of professionalism. Without invoking “judicial culture,” they 
claim, PPT analysis cannot explain convergences of judicial review 
in the teeth of divergence of constitutional design without losing 
“much of its edge” and becoming “indeterminate.”232 Although ju-
dicial culture might account for certain likenesses in UK and US ad-
ministrative law (for example, the comparable concepts of “reason-
ableness” and “rationality” or the very readiness of courts to expand 
the purview of judicial review against the rise of the administrative 
state), it provides no satisfactory explanation of the two common 
law systems’ antithetical approaches to questions of law and fact; 
for if the cultures of the English and American judiciaries are so 
kindred, then why, how, and when would they ever have diverged 
so substantially on matters so central to the common law of public 
administration?
Since the end of the Second World War, judicial review has 
expanded in proportion as Parliament and Congress have enacted 
more regulatory programs and delegated more discretion to admin-
istrators. In England the traditional doctrine that courts are prob-
ingly to review administrators’ understandings of law yet respect 
their operational autonomy remains intact. In America, however, 
229 Matthew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role 
of Law, in Weingast and Wittman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 
at 279 (cited in note 54).
230 Arancibia, Judicial Review of Commercial Regulation at 80 (cited in 
note 68).
23 Magill and Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory at 43, 45 (cited in 
note 3).
232 Id.
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the Chevron–State Farm framework that emerged in the 980s, as 
divided government and partisan polarization became consolidated 
into the political norm pressurizes courts to defer to agencies on 
matters of statutory interpretation, yet “nitpick” substantive con-
clusions on factual and evidential grounds.233 This inversion of the 
Anglo-American administrative law of review of questions of law 
versus of fact is complete. This Article has broken new ground in 
using the conventional tools of positive political theory analysis 
to explain the institutional and strategic underpinnings of English 
administrative law, in addition to its American counterpart. It was 
hypothesized that the fewer the effective vetogates in a polity, the 
more judicial review will concentrate on questions of law and the 
less on questions of fact, and vice versa. It was also argued that 
the underlying causal mechanism that produces these results stems 
from legislators’ aggregate preferences to control agency costs, on 
the one hand, and apex court judges’ aggregate preferences to con-
serve judicial authority and resources, on the other. 
Concretely put, the absence of multiple effective vetogates in 
the United Kingdom permitted House of Commons majorities to 
delegate to administrators the least possible de facto law-making 
authority. This has obliged the Law Lords to defer to Parliament’s 
and the Government’s primary role in oversight but not residual 
administrative understandings of law. By contrast, the prolifera-
tion of effective vetogates in the United States in the late twentieth 
century has driven Congress to delegate vast law-making powers 
to the administrative state, while undermining the efficacy of its 
oversight mechanisms. The doctrinal encoding of judicial deference 
to agency statutory interpretations, as heavily demanded by such a 
political system, helped to prevent the American law-making pro-
cess from grinding to a halt, while the relative oversight vacuum left 
by divided government gridlock opened up avenues for aggressive 
judicial review of agency findings of fact.
The foregoing inquiry, however incomplete, is enough to support 
the proposition that the theory of vetogates, so integral to modern 
democratic constitutional design, has power to explain major cur-
rents in contemporary Anglo-American administrative law and how 
its doctrines, both activist and deferential, harden over time into 
seldom questioned heuristics of judicial decision making. It is unde-
niable that culturally embedded legal and moral principles provide 
judges with powerful motives and justifications for enhanced judi-
cial intervention in administrative processes. But to attribute to a 
233 Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking at 452 (cited in 
note 97).
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vaguely defined “judicial culture” precise doctrinal convergences 
and divergences is to introduce a tincture of self-fulfilling proph-
ecy into social scientific inquiry. The development of antithetical 
administrative law doctrines in the United Kingdom and the United 
States was in no way predetermined by judicial culture. It is here 
where PPT, of which the incentive analyses have wider applicability 
across time and space,234 is most productive.
234 See Garoupa and Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputation ver-
sus Legal Tradition at 442 (cited in note 8).
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